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The role of large management consultancy firms in global public policy  
Glenn Morgan, Andrew Sturdy and Michal Frenkel 
 
Abstract 
The formation of global public policy takes place in diverse fields populated by a range 
of different actors. One important, but neglected group of actors is large management 
consultancy firms. This chapter examines why  and how such firms have been able to 
exercise influence over global public policy. Emphasis is placed on their reputational 
power, their organizational structures which enable them to use and develop expertise 
and the importance of their social networks amongst other elite actors. The chapter 
illustrates these themes through a case study of the REDD Initiative sponsored by the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It concludes by outlining a research 
agenda which focuses on the power of consultancies in this arena, but also recognizes 
the limits to this power.  
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The role of large management consultancy firms in global public policy 
 
Introduction 
Recent discussions of the development of global public policy have pointed to the 
significance of large management consultancy firms (LMCFs) such as McKinsey, PWC 
and Accenture in this process (Stone, 2013). The use of consultants in national policy 
contexts has long been recognized (Martin, 1998; Saint-Martin, 2000) and debates have 
developed on their impact as servants of power, unaccountable technocrats, purveyors 
of neo-liberal ideas and practices, or as a neo-colonial arm of the Global North (Prince, 
2012; Howlett and Migone, 2013; Wedel, 2014). Much of this research emphasizes that 
management consultancies offer their public sector and NGO clients legitimacy as well 
as expertise – ‘reputational intermediaries’ (Stone, 2004: 557). As long established 
purveyors of advice and practices to large private sector organizations in much of the 
industrialized world, their expertise is often treated relatively unproblematically, even 
to the extent that it should also be applied to public sector contexts, including public 
policy. Clearly this perception is in turn, deeply embedded in neo-liberal ideas of 
increasing the influence of private sector practices into government and undermining 
the notion of a distinctive public sector bureaucratic ethos (du Gay, 2009). Thus, much 
of the analysis of what is often termed the ‘consultocracy’ emphasizes that, within many 
national contexts, it has become increasingly legitimate to bring private sector ideas 
into government through consultancies, even if only as the ‘footsoldiers’ of the clients 
rather than innovators  (Hodge & Bowman, 2006: 116).  
 
It has long been suspected that something similar is happening in global or  
transnational public policy (Stone, 2004; 2012). However, there has been very little 
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research on management consultancy in this context (O'Mahoney and Markham, 2013).  
In this paper, we focus on the role of large consultancy firms. Specifically, we focus on 
mostly multinational consultancies, most of which are headquartered in the US and the 
UK with a network of offices spread across the most important economic centres of the 
world (Morgan, Sturdy, & Quack, 2006). Whilst there are differences in the origins, 
governance structures, business focus, reputation and rankings of these firms (Kipping 
& Kirkpatrick, 2013: Engwall et al. 2016),  over time, significant similarities have 
developed around their ‘professional’ model and organisation of consulting (see David 
et al, 2013). In particular, given the intangibility of the product, heavy reliance is placed 
on relationships with clients and fostering the reputation for expertise and reliability 
through various signals or professional practices (Kipping, 2011). They also share a 
reliance and focus on multinational and transnational client bases, both as a source of 
income, networks and prestige and as a way of gaining a foothold in new geographical 
markets. Finally, the services offered typically include four elements offering expertise, 
legitimacy, the facilitation of internal organizational change and the provision of extra 
labour (so called ‘body shopping’) to help clients deal with new projects (Sturdy, 2011).   
 
The global public policy sphere is particularly important for this group of consultancies. 
Firstly, many of their existing clients may be affected by the emergence of new 
transnational policies, approaches and regulations, making it  important for LMCFs to 
keep themselves informed and act at this transnational level  to support their existing 
clients. Secondly, this sphere offers potential new business as governments and firms 
respond to regulatory and policy changes, especially when consultancies are finding 
maintaining their existing markets and clients is increasingly difficult. Thirdly, LMCFs 
have the potential to be influential in global public policy because of its relative 
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permeability and the fact that it is sometimes substantially less organized than national 
policy domains (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2015). In national contexts, the key actors, 
institutional arenas, mechanisms of accountability and framing devices are generally 
well-known, even if contested. In the global sphere however, these phenomena often 
tend to be more diffuse and vary in their degree of organization enabling large 
multinational consultancy firms to access this arena. However, two key issues need to 
be considered in determining how this occurs. Firstly, how do these firms translate their 
legitimacy from within national public policy contexts to the global level? Secondly 
and just as importantly, what gives LMCFs the capacity to involve themselves in this 
arena and contribute to the formulation and framing of global problems, as well as 
engaging in development of possible solutions that are both technical and detailed in 
scope and also politically acceptable to powerful actors?  
 
At the same time, LMCFs may also have certain vulnerabilities in this sphere which we 
wish to explore. As powerful and largely unaccountable actors and ones often cloaked 
in secrecy based around developing a corporate mystique and on claims to client 
confidentiality, consultancy is subject to considerable critique (Sturdy, 2009; Mohe, 
2008). This critique of rule by the ‘consultocracy’ (Hodge and Bowman, 2006) takes 
various forms and is directed to some of the very qualities that make consulting 
attractive to clients such as its outsider status, generalized solutions and notional 
independence. In the public policy context, critiques are further directed towards a lack 
of transparency and accountability in contexts where such processes are normalized 
together with the high costs of consultancy services. Therefore our approach involves 




In order to explore the role of LMCFs, we firstly take a particular firm and case of 
global public policy - the global strategy-based consultancy, McKinsey & Co. and its 
central role in problem formulation and solution building in the REDD+ initiative. The 
acronym REDD stands for countries' efforts to  reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation.  In this programme, from 2007, McKinsey rapidly became what 
was described as the ‘go-to’ company for countries seeking advice on how to access 
funds from REDD+, an extension of the original REDD project. However, in 2011, its 
role was attacked by a number of NGOs, most prominent amongst them was 
Greenpeace. Subsequent to this, McKinsey’s public involvement in REDD+ scaled 
down as more actors entered the processes of problem definition, solution identification 
and programme implementation. We then discuss the organizational strategy and 
structure of  LMCFs like McKinsey which make them both capable of being influential 
in the transnational sphere and yet also vulnerable to criticism from competing actors. 
 
Forming global public policy: the case of  REDD+ 
The origins of REDD+ lie in the gradual inter-twining of concerns over deforestation, 
particularly of tropical rainforests, and climate change. The question of deforestation 
first emerged in the 1980s, but little was done until the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, and the publication of its 
first major report two years later. The IPCC concluded that humanity's emissions are 
adding to the atmosphere's natural complement of greenhouse gases, and that this 
addition could be expected to result in increased global warming . The IPCC report and 
other publications at the time called attention to the fact that tropical forests are crucial 
to storing carbon emissions. That such forests were being cut down and not replaced as 
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a result of both legal and illegal logging was therefore a contributory cause. Following 
this report, in 1992, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, governments agreed to the 
United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which 
has met annually since then and is supported by the UN secretariat. Its key objective 
was "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system"( Article 
2 of the UNFCCC adopted in 1992 available at 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.). The Kyoto Protocol that was 
agreed upon in 1997, constituted the next step in the UN policy aimed at reducing 
emissions.  
 
However, progress on forests through UNFCCC was slow and the initiative passed to 
NGOs and particularly to the idea of establishing forest certification. This involved 
setting up a multi-stakeholder framework of rules whereby forests could be certified as 
being managed in a sustainable manner. Forest owners and users of timbers were 
supposed to follow rules about what could and could not be used from forests and what 
should be planted in order to replenish timber stock (Gulbrandsen, 2010). FSC 
certification appeared as a badge on wood products in general and in the retail market 
particularly in furniture. As with other certification efforts, e.g. Fair Trade, the 
assumption was that aware consumers would buy FSC certified products. Voluntary 
codes put some pressure on producers via their reputation amongst consumers. In more 
recent years,  the US government and the EU have also used these voluntary codes in 
association with their own regulatory efforts (Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014).  
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In the early 2000s, as concerns about climate change escalated, the UN, the World Bank 
and a number of governments and NGOs became concerned that progress was too slow 
and  using voluntary certification schemes was not a sufficient response (see Wright 
and Nyberg 2015). It was out of this concern that, at ‘COP13’ held in 2007, an action 
plan began to take form to encourage emerging economies to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and degradation (REDD) (Bok, 2014). Even at this early stage, McKinsey 
was involved and developing what became its key technical input to the process – the 
cost curve. As a 2008 report from their Australia office stated: "McKinsey and 
Company has worked with leading institutions and experts over the past two years to 
develop an understanding of the cost and potential of different options for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions – first at the global level, then through country specific 
analyses including efforts in the UK, the US and Germany" (Lewis and Gomer, 2008).  
 
The discussions at COP13 involved a marked shift back in terms of forest issues from 
voluntary self-regulation of producers to a focus on government action in emerging 
economies. The new policy was however couched, not so much in the language of 
regulation and enforcement, but rather that of ‘incentives’ and ‘monitoring’. The REDD 
and REDD+ initiatives were to provide a financial value to the maintenance of  forests 
to combat the idea that it was only by logging that forests could generate value. REDD+ 
extends REDD by emphasizing not just reducing emissions through stopping 
deforestation but also adding payment to affected parties to encourage them to take part 




Governments and companies were to receive funds according to how much carbon they 
kept locked up in their forests by ensuring that deforestation was reduced and forest 
resources managed better. First of all, this required other (e.g. western) governments, 
but also potentially and subsequently other actors such as large multinational 
corporations, the EU, the World Bank and national governments in the developed North 
to agree to put funds into a pot that could be used to create such incentives. Unlike 
carbon markets in other contexts however, the REDD+ system did not compensate or 
benefit the donor, e.g. in the form of generating carbon credits that could be used to 
offset carbon emissions in the donor’s country. The scheme was given an initial impetus 
by the government of Norway coming forward and contributing funds to the REDD+ 
programme later followed by the US, the UK, Germany and other developed 
economies, together pledging around $3.5bn by 2009. Interest in accessing these funds 
from countries with tropical forests was high.  
 
Drawing on a variety of sources (inter alia Greenpeace 2011, Dyer and Counsell 2010; 
Bock, 2014; McDonald, 2013), we can show how McKinsey engaged with this 
developing process. First of all, in 2007 McKinsey developed a quantitative technique 
embedded in an analytical tool, which they described as the Marginal Abatement Curve 
(MAC). The role of the MAC was to evaluate how to produce the greatest effect on 
reducing emissions for the least cost. For example, would undertaking a certain activity 
or carrying it out in a new way lead to a saving for those involved, or a cost, and what 
would be the consequences for reducing carbon emissions? Thus, for example, it was 
found that switching from incandescent to LED lighting would save people money, but 
that the impact on carbon emissions would be relatively small. At the other end of the 
scale, fitting coal power stations with proper carbon capture and storage facilities would 
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be very expensive, but would have a much more significant impact on overall 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
McKinsey investigated the cost and impact of around 40 such activities and produced 
a clear visual representation of this in a number of their publications. In particular, this 
revealed that reducing deforestation would lead to a significant positive impact on 
emissions at a relatively low cost compared to other abatement activities. In effect, it 
gave a substantial boost to both donor countries and to potential recipients to believe 
that providing financial incentives to reduce deforestation would be highly effective in 
terms of dealing with climate change.  McKinsey had taken an active part in redefining 
or translating an abstract global "problem" into a seemingly concrete and manageable 
one, identifying ‘quick wins’ for those wishing to reduce emissions. The problem was 
articulated in practical terms (that is, it was identified through the use of a series of 
quantitative technical measures for understanding the relationship between costs and 
mitigation impacts). Once the problem was identified and the solutions appropriately 
ranked, then it was a simple question of getting on with implementing the solution. This 
opened the road for McKinsey to participate in developing (and selling) acceptable 
implementation plans and then for engaging in business relationships with clients 
through offering these solutions and implementation plans ( Sturdy, 1997). 
 
Why was it seen as legitimate for McKinsey to involve itself in this global policy arena? 
It is relevant to note that McKinsey has a long established reputation as an advisory and 
problem solving organization for both the public and the private sector going back some 
decades (McKenna, 2006; McDonald, 2013). It particularly cultivated a reputation for 
‘thought leadership’ through its journal The McKinsey Quarterly and, subsequently, 
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through  the McKinsey Global Institute which published freely available reports on a 
variety of issues. From 2000, McKinsey also established its Climate Change Desk to 
explore and shape the emerging debates in this particular area. It was therefore engaging 
with public policy, and particularly climate change, from relatively early on. It is 
important to recognize two aspects of this engagement. Firstly, McKinsey had 
substantial resources and organizational slack to invest in such activities without 
expecting an immediate payback. This reflects its business strategy and model which, 
whilst not unique in the area of professional service firms, is uncommon more widely, 
including in public policy domains. Secondly, it is important to highlight the contrast 
between the outward facing thought leadership of consulting on the one side and on the 
other the often highly secretive internal processes where proprietory knowledger is 
jealously guarded. The latter lie behind and follow on from the former in that tools and 
techniques are developed and client projects are conducted based on knowledge and 
techniques developed by McKinsey over decades and delivered by consultants trained 
and skilled in the implementation of this knowledge. It is because its clients believe that 
this knowledge and skill sets is (a) valuable and (b) not attainable or imitable elsewhere 
that McKinsey is able to generate its substantial revenues even in an increasingly 
competitive market for consultancy services.      
 
The development of the MAC curve illustrates these phenomena. McKinsey has always 
kept the details of how it reached the MAC conclusions a secret, refusing to divulge 
details on commercial grounds. Yet its conclusions were significant for setting the 
agenda for global policy discussions amongst interested actors (international 
organisations, national governments, expert networks, NGOs and transnational social 
movements) in the period from 2009-2011. They also had very public consequences 
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even though the public was not able to evaluate in detail how these conclusions had 
been reached, McKinsey were not the only ones working on a MAC curve; there were 
academics also engaged in this and issuing words of caution (e.g. Kesicki and Ekins 
2012). Nevertheless, in the first instance, policymakers accepted as legitimate 
McKinsey’s data and model without subjecting it to rigorous analysis.  
 
McKinsey did its best to place the model at the centre of the debate amongst 
governments and NGOs, drawing on its closeness to other powerful actors with their 
own claims to legitimacy in this field to reinforce the importance and validity of its 
model. McKinsey was instrumental in organizing a high profile meeting chaired by 
Prince Charles in May 2009, to raise awareness of the need for emergency action to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in tropical rainforests following 
the inconclusive outcome of the UN Bali climate change conference in 2007.  Other 
high profile participants included Hillary Clinton, Nicholas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel, 
Kevin Rudd, Taro Aso, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Jens Stoltenberg, Jose Manuel 
Barroso and Robert Zoellick. The involvement of political leaders reflects the effort to 
build legitimacy for the emerging new idea – the MAC curve and the key contribution 
of McKinsey – by mobilising a highly visible network of people perceived to be 
influential through their organizational roles, their own extended networks and their 
reputation for leadership in global affairs. 
 
McKinsey moved swiftly to develop the business opportunity that was evolving.  It 
produce tailored reports for both governments from the North interested in using 
deforestation as a way to mitigate climate change and governments from emerging 
economies with high levels of forestation (and deforestation) which would benefit if 
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they were able to successfully apply for funds under REDD+. The basic model was to 
show the long-term consequences of current rates of deforestation and carbon emission 
given trends in a particular country and then to identify how much would be needed to 
compensate the actors in that country sufficiently to cause deforestation to stop. Of 
course, the rate of deforestation depended on multiple factors, including the strategies 
of big logging companies, but also illegal loggers and, associated with that, weak, 
inefficient and often corrupt enforcement. These factors and others varied across 
countries and McKinsey offered its expertise to individual governments in low income 
countries which lacked the administrative capacity to do such analyses on their own to 
the level that would satisfy Western donors. McKinsey’s involvement was reassuring 
to governments in the North who often part-funded reports. In this period (2009-2011) 
therefore, McKinsey were commissioned by a number of governments (e.g. Brazil, 
Mexico, Guyana, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea) to prepare readiness plans which 
identified options for reducing deforestation.  
 
However, Greenpeace (2011) and others like the Rainforest Foundation, and Friends of 
the Earth, subjected the assumptions of this model to severe critique from 2010 
onwards. Reducing deforestation through stopping what was labeled as ‘slash and burn’ 
agriculture by indigenous peoples was deemed to be ‘low hanging fruit’ in the sense 
that it was low cost, but offered substantial savings. However, the criteria by which 
McKinsey managed to define the loss of aboriginal habitats and ways of life as ‘low-
cost’ (i.e. little compensation) was never made explicit. On the other hand, McKinsey 
argued that encouraging large timber companies not to cut down forests was to be seen 
as a high cost to the companies. These firms therefore required high levels of 
compensation to cease this activity. Such arguments were challenged by Greenpeace 
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and others as projecting unsustainable and highly unlikely growth trends in terms of 
demand for forest products; more realistic projections would therefore reduce greatly 
the compensation needed for the large logging. To the NGOs, it became quite clear that 
McKinsey’s priorities were with its private sector clients (such as the forest companies) 
and those in government who could buy their services and by implication they were 
relatively unconcerned about the fate of those who actually lived and survived in the 
forest. Governments with tropical rain forests were keen to access funds as soon as 
possible and were therefore willing to use McKinsey’s services to produce a well-
articulated case for their claims. According to REDD Monitor  -- an independent  
website devoted to the exploration of "the contradictions and controversy" behind the 
REDD -- and other sources, McKinsey was also used by a lot of countries because at 
the height of initial REDD+ enthusiasm, they had the capacity to produce reports for 
potential recipient governments within a matter of weeks using their now well-
established template.  
 
Further research would be necessary to understand exactly how these emergent 
critiques impacted on REDD+, but what does appear clear is that the whole process 
suddenly slowed down at about the time the criticisms were at their height.  In one 
review, Anglesen (2016) refers to the slow progress of REDD+ and the ‘cynicism’ 
surrounding it. No money has actually been handed out for REDD+ via the UN  though 
here have been some bilateral REDD+ deals particularly with Norway, (Angelsen, 
2016.) Instead, there has been substantial funding for ‘capacity-building’ activities to 
prepare for REDD+ funds. This reflects the degree to which, after 2011, the politics of 
REDD+ became more salient and funders and sponsors began to emphasize the need to 
involve and secure the support of different groups of forest stakeholders. Since the 
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sustained attack on McKinsey by NGOs in 2011, the firm has been less visible in the 
REDD+ process. Rather, through an initial process of capacity building, the UNFCCC 
has sought to engage a wider group of stakeholders and address some of the 
distributional issues associated with REDD + measures before actually disbursing 
funds. 
 
The influence of Management consultancies in the global public policy arena 
The REDD+ example provides a useful context in which to understand how global 
management consultancies play a role in the formation of public policy. Although our 
focus has been on one company, McKinsey, it is clear that others have been involved. 
Deloitte, for example, has been involved in evaluating REDD+ projects emerging from 
cooperation between Norway and Tanzania. In Indonesia, the local managing director 
of Accenture became the inaugural head of Indonesia's REDD+ Management Agency 
in 2014, illustrating the close links that had emerged between the consultancy and 
REDD+ projects. 
 
Central to this influence is that these organizations possess immense prestige and 
legitimacy from their decades of experience and contemporary networks with clients 
and elites more generally. In the case of REDD+, as Bock (2014) points out, donor 
countries and the UN were likely to take more notice of what McKinsey said about 
ways of implementing REDD+ than they were of NGOs, at least in the early stages. 
Similarly, in keeping with the legitimating role of external consultants and the high 
profile of McKinsey (McDonald, 2013), potential recipients could see that if they had 
reports written for them by the firm, and if they incorporated these suggestions into 
their funding bids, they were likely to get a more favourable hearing than if they either 
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did it themselves (usually impossible as few of them had the capacity to do so) or 
employed a less well-known and less networked company. This matches 
understandings and research on consultancy in other policy contexts (Stone, 2004) and 
more generally, where its legitimating function is as important as its expertise, and often 
more so (Sturdy, 2011). 
 
Where does this legitimacy come from, and how impregnable or impervious is it to 
criticism? Existing literature on LMCFs provides some insights as to how McKinsey 
and others may have gained global authority and trust among REDD+ donors and 
clients. First, these companies are seen as repositories of expertise across a huge range 
of areas in business, management and the public sector. As Bock points out, this 
expertise is presented as ‘neutral’, as technical and ‘objective’. However, many 
commentators would also argue that this knowledge is far from neutral, and not simply 
in terms of reflecting their particular market interests (Wedel, 2014; O’Mahoney and 
Sturdy, 2016). It is typically based on neo-liberal frameworks where solutions to public 
policy problems are constructed through markets, privatization and private actors 
pursuing profit opportunities whilst public actors adjudicate and make sure that market 
failures do not occur (Jupe and Funnell, 2015). The fact that management consultancies 
hold their expertise as proprietary knowledge means that, unlike much of the 
knowledge generated in universities and public organizations, fundamental 
assumptions are not revealed or as open to scrutiny. As the REDD+ example and the 
role of the McKinsey MAC makes clear, the outside world is meant to ‘trust’ the 
technical calculations of the consultancies and is not given the tools or the data to ‘test’ 
or challenge them independently.   
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Central to this is that LMCFs cultivate a reputation for delivering public goods as well 
as gaining private profit. Their claim to ‘thought leadership’ is based on the idea that 
the LMCFs occupy a unique position where they can blend their own expertise with 
their massive practical experience on projects for all sorts of clients across many parts 
of the world. Their ‘thought leadership’ is therefore a ‘gift’ they bestow on the world 
and reflects the fact that as firms, they are responsible corporate citizens interested in 
exploring ideas and processes with other opinion-formers before such ideas become 
business opportunities. Their thought leadership becomes an input to defining or the 
co-construction of “problems” in the transnational sphere (Seabrooke & tsingou, 2015). 
Thought leadership, for example, is visible at McKinsey in its sponsorship of the 
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) and the McKinsey Quarterly. Both stand on the 
border between business schools and more client focused activities.  
 
‘Thought leadership’ or attempts at contributing to debates in a manner which indirectly 
supports commercial interests, is, of course, a cost to the companies; it does not 
generate immediate revenue. It is not therefore a capacity that can be developed without 
having a business model that can support such non-revenue generating activities. This 
business model is essentially based on the consultancy firms’ ability to sustain a high-
cost model justified by a belief amongst senior executives in clients that employing 
consultants can generate high value returns. Whilst this approach to consulting has 
recently come under some pressure from a variety of sources, such as cheaper 
competitors, clients using internal resources and the use of new technologies and 
outsourcing (Christensen et al, 2013; Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2015), it also evolves 
and adapts in response to such challenges, including moving more than ever into public 
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sector business as  private sector business has suffered from the financial crisis and 
recession (McDonald, 2013).   
 
Secondly, legitimacy comes from a variety of features of the firms. One is their 
recruitment  policy  to recruit the best and the brightest from the top universities and 
business schools around the world like other professional service organizations such as 
law firms and accountancies, (David et al, 2013). In doing so, they reinforce the image 
of themselves as a high pressure/high reward organization and the image of individual 
consultants as the best and the brightest, recruited seemingly because of their successful 
meritocratic performance at school and university (Khan 2010; Rivera, 2016). 
Characteristic of these emerging elites is that they do not enclose themselves in limited 
circles of social and cultural capital but on the contrary what they learn at private 
schools and elite higher education institutions is to navigate multiple social and cultural 
environments in a globalizing world.  
 
Legitimacy also comes from the ability of the firms to undertake tasks quickly and 
effectively. This is possible because of the availability of expertise and the creation and 
leveraging of social networks (Maister, 2003). The firms  recruit very large number of 
graduates at the bottom rung of the career ladder who are expected to work very long 
hours and show high levels of commitment. Such firms are willing to face high levels 
of attrition in the early years (up to 80% may leave in 5 years) (O’Shea and Madigan, 
1997), as some people decide this is not what they want or it is decided for them, 
following frequent and intense staff reviews. Indeed, some firms operate a ‘rank and 
yank’ policy to ensure that each year a certain percentage of the cohort are ejected from 
the firm. This creates an intensely competitive atmosphere (Boussebaa, Morgan, & 
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Sturdy, 2012). Few of the original cohort are likely to make it all the way to the top of 
the firm, but in this way, recruitment and selection can produce highly loyal, highly 
competent and hard working employees.  
 
These large numbers of early entrants constitute a huge, flexible and capable resource 
for the companies. It is a resource which can be mobilized quickly to deliver on projects 
driven by tight timetables, often in diverse cultural contexts. It is also a resource which 
is present in key economic centres across the world. Individuals can, in principle, be 
moved at relatively short notice from one geographical area to another (Pereira and 
Derudder, 2010). As global companies with highly integrated  management, 
communication and information systems, teams can be assembled relatively quickly 
even if there may be resistances from some lead (e.g. US/UK) offices to giving up 
resources (Boussebaa, Morgan, & Sturdy, 2012). Such companies also develop shared 
proprietary knowledge resources such as the McKinsey MAC which are available 
across the organization in standardized knowledge banks. Clients can bring problems, 
even ill-defined problems, to these firms and know that they have the resources 
available quickly to help articulate the problem and co-produce or support an ‘answer’ 
(Sturdy, 2016). In an era that has been described as one of ‘fast policy’ (Peck & 
Theodore, 2015), management consultancies have a structure and strategy that enables 
them to respond. It is important however, to recognize that management consultants 
rarely fit the traditional image of the technical expert prescribing a solution to clients 
in a report (such as discussed in the chapter by Sending, this volume). Projects and 
client-consultant power and trust relations vary (Fincham, 1999), but most involve 
clients and consultants working together, such that ‘solutions’ are, to varying degrees, 
tailored to client needs (Sturdy et al, 2009).  
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Another strength of LMCFs is that in contexts where knowledge and its quality is highly 
uncertain, reputation is sustained, in large part, by social networks and associated trust 
relations (Armbruster, 2010). The phenomenon of revolving doors at senior levels of 
government is well-known in many countries and management consultancies provide 
many examples (see Craig, 2005), e.g. the example noted earlier of the Accenture 
executive in Indonesia becoming leader of the country’s REDD+ management system. 
Just as important, but less visible, is how junior and middle ranks of consultancies 
participate in this process. As governments have thinned down their internal resources, 
the use of secondments from consultancy into middle ranks of the civil service to help 
form policies has become a naturalized part of government reflecting the increased 
interpenetration of public and private and the downgrading of the bureaucratic ethic as 
described earlier (Crouch, 2016). This solidifies connections and networks for when 
fast policy is required and can be associated with what has become known as ‘double-
dealing’ (Engwall and Kipping,  2006).  In the REDD+ case, consultants help construct 
problems with regulatory bodies such as the UN or EU Directorates and then, 
subsequently, advise the organisations affected by the regulation they have helped to 
devise (also O’Mahoney and Sturdy, 2016; Wedel, 2014).  
 
Probably the most significant networks for firms such as McKinsey are its former 
employees or alumni who often assume influential positions. McKinsey is widely 
known for its impressive alumni body and makes great play of it when, in other 
contexts, it can be very secretive (Mcdonald, 2013). No matter what the circumstances 
in which a person left, ‘ranked and yanked’, voluntarily leaving or being head hunted 
into a different organization, they are encouraged to think of themselves as members of 
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the extended McKinsey community. It is a badge of high status on the CV and offers a 
network of linkages across firms, across governments, across countries. While such a 
process operates in other professional services firms such as banking, and law, it is 
particularly visible in LCMFs where it is part of the attraction for joining: one will 
forever be marked as a McKinsey alumni in the same way one might carry the Harvard 
or Oxford connection through life as a marker of distinction.  
 
Contesting consultancy 
It is however important to emphasize that this trust and legitimacy is fragile or, at least, 
subject to challenge. Both now and historically, consultants have been subject to 
critique, reflected in media and NGO scrutiny of their activities. An easy target has 
been the amount of consultancy fees which have been paid out by governments at a 
time of austerity particularly where there has been a failure to demonstrate a positive 
impact from their intervention. Another element of this process is revealed in the 
REDD+ case, where Greenpeace among others has argued that McKinsey’s 
underpinning technical model and the recommendations emerging from it are shaped 
by their concern to protect the interests of their major corporate clients at the expense 
of the occupants of the forest (Shankland and Hasenclaver 2011). This reflects the 
critique (Wedel 2014) that they are closely identified with neo-liberal market ideas and 
practices, with the discredited elites who were responsible for the 2008 financial crash 
and with a set of interests and epistemology that einforces the power of the North and 
fails to recognize alternative subaltern voices from the South (Frenkel and Shenhav, 
2012). This critique can, paradoxically, serve to reinforce their powerful position as 
they can serve as a distraction or a lightening rod to divert attention from the roles of 
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other actors such as politicians, policy makers and managers – consultants can be made 
scapegoats for failures elsewhere (Sturdy, 2009).  
 
As consultancies move into more political and public policy issues, they become more 
visible and more susceptible to these sorts of campaigns which have potential to spill 
over into other areas and undermine their legitimacy. In that sense, consultancies face 
a dilemma arising from possible loss of reputation as they engage in more public policy 
matters. At a time when governments are still divesting themselves of a range of 
activities in response to austerity and neo-liberal ideas of new public management, 
consultancies have a potential large expanding market but the dynamics of working in 
the public arena are different from the private sector. Transparency demands in the 
public arena are much stronger than in the private sector where commercial secrecy can 
be invoked. Therefore consultancies may find themselves challenged to reveal their 
inner workings more than they have experienced in the past. Assumptions about pricing 
services which may go unchallenged in the private sector can lead to harsh and public  
criticism of value for money in the public arena. Consultancies might become cautious 
about how they intervene in public policy in order to avoid some of these transparency 
requirements or criticisms of their profitability. NGOs such as Greenpeace can 
considerably damage consultancies under some circumstances but rather than 
withdrawing altogether, consultancies may simply choose to participate in more closed 
networks and processes.  It is important therefore to recognize the contested and 





 In this chapter, we have explored why and how international large management 
consultancy firms have become so important in global public policy. Whilst 
recognizing the value of explanations which point to the importance of expertise and 
the legitimacy which it generates as well as the embeddedness of this expertise in the 
dominant ideological framework of neo-liberalism, we have aimed to go beyond them 
in two ways. Firstly, we have argued that expertise and legitimacy are embedded in the 
particular global structures and strategies of these companies. As our REDD+ case 
suggests, in less organized, diffuse global policy arenas in which leadership is not 
formally granted to a single international organization, and where boundaries are fuzzy, 
coordination and control of the process of policy making is difficult to achieve. Here 
then, the global legitimacy and organizational capacities associated with the 
international LMCFs, appear to give them an advantage in determining the rules of the 
game.  At the national level, other actors may have the necessary networks, knowledge 
and expertise – embeddedness - to compete with LMCFs and resist their solutions. In 
less organized or, at least, less established global policy arenas, no other single social 
actor has the necessary networks, capabilities and expertise that would be recognized 
by both global and local authorities in the global north and south, by governments and 
big corporations, to be able to shape and promote a global policy in the way that 
McKinsey has done.       
 
Global consultancies’ high cost/high value business model - whilst under threat from 
competitors and economic recession - still provides a level of resource that enables the 
firms to spend on ‘thought leadership’, a non-revenue generating activity, but one 
which facilitates the development of prestige and reputation and therefore, indirectly, 
revenue. This model is built on high leverage ratios and the recruitment of a veritable 
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army of the self-proclaimed ‘best and brightest’ to work on projects at short notice. 
Clients can expect ‘fast policy’ to be generated out of these structures. This is also 
reinforced by the development of secondments and internships from the management 
consultancy firms into government and regulatory organizations. The development of 
alumni networks as the cohorts of recruits are thinned out provides a further set of 
contacts that can be used to respond to the requirements of fast policy formation. The 
international nature both of these networks and of the firms and consultants themselves 
as well as their high levels of technical competence reinforces this ability to be present 
in the early stages of problem definition and identification as well as in the creation and 
implementation of solutions.  
 
Paradoxically however, when LMCFs have very few potential competitors in the 
shaping of the global policy phase, their own work can contribute to the construction 
of a better organized and less diffuse policy arena. This institutionalization renders 
them more visible and less distinctive. Our second contribution then, of showing how 
these firms are not all powerful is reinforced, in that LMCFS can be challenged by 
NGOs and governments particularly as they step more clearly into the political, public 
policy arena. Furthermore, the trust they have established with their key clients 
elsewhere is less pervasive amongst the sorts of NGOs and social movements which 
have emerged in policy arenas more strongly since the 2008 crisis. On the one hand, 
LMCFs are tempted into this field by slower growth in the private sector and potential 
scope of reach, but on the other hand, this can open them up to more scrutiny and 
criticism. They therefore have to be prepared to develop new ways of doing business 
in the global public policy arena that reduce visibility and potential critique.  
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These conclusions are tentative; there is a need for much more research on different 
areas of global public policy in which consultancies have been active. Indeed, there 
remains a dearth of research on the power of consultancy in general, beyond studies of 
specific client-consultancy relations (O’Mahoney and Sturdy, 2016). Climate change, 
deforestation and carbon markets together offer many interesting empirical possibilities 
as do other areas, including the more established arenas of global public policy, such 
as health, demography, education, energy provision, food production and security 
amongst others. Although we have focused on some of the common characteristics of 
LMCFs, there is a need to go beyond a single firm and case and look to other 
organizations, large and small to assess if their influence, methods and models differ 
significantly. Furthermore, with networks energized by individuals as well as firms and 
their reputations and with doors constantly revolving, it is important to follow the 
individuals, perhaps using different methods, such as shadowing, network analysis, 
prosography, and analysis of data collected from social media e.g. LinkedIn and 
Twitter. We have only touched the surface of consulting critiques and their sources and 
effects. Are such dynamics evident more widely among policy actors, including clients, 
and at what stages and what forms do they take? Finally, we still know very little of the 
market itself. What are the sources of demand for LCMF input, and how do they interact 
in this sphere with governments, international organisations and global civil society 
actors such as corporate philanthropy foundations, think-tanks, firms and lobbying 
organizations, NGOs and multi-stakeholder governance organizational forms? By 
pursuing some of these new research areas, a better understanding of the key actors in 
global public policy and their impact on outcomes is achievable. 
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